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The PabstCity Redevelopment Project:
Inflated Projections
and
Dubious Economic Assumptions

A report prepared for the City of Milwaukee Common Council,
Committee on Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development

The University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee
Center for Economic Development
June 6, 2005

ABOUT THIS REPORT
This briefing paper was produced at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee Center
for Economic Development (UWMCED) as a pro-bono service to the Common Council
of the City of Milwaukee, Committee on Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development. This
report seeks to provide council members with independent, non-partisan analysis of some
of the key economic assumptions underpinning the PabstCity TID proposal, the biggest
city funding ever proposed for a Milwaukee commercial project. The Center has not been
compensated for the report, nor is the Center supported by any of the principals with
interests in the project. The Center’s participation is strictly in line with its mission: to
contribute to informed public debate about issues of economic development policy in the
city and the region. The analysis and conclusions in this report are solely those of the
UWMCED, and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of WisconsinMilwaukee, or any of the Center’s sponsors.
The author of this report is Dr. Marc V. Levine, Professor and Director of the
UWMCED. Pamela Fendt, a policy analyst at the Center, contributed research and
analysis.
The UWMCED strongly believes that informed public debate is vital to the
development of good public policy. The Center publishes briefing papers, detailed
analyses of economic trends and policies, and “technical assistance” reports on issues of
applied economic development. In these ways, as well as in conferences and public
lectures sponsored by the Center, we hope to contribute to public discussion on economic
development policy in Southeastern Wisconsin.
Further information about the Center and its reports and activities is available at our
web site: www.ced.uwm.edu
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INTRODUCTION
PabstCity represents, according to its promoters, “one of the most significant
economic development initiatives ever undertaken in our region,” generating economic
benefits to “respond to many of the area’s priorities.” 1 Even after downscaling their
original request for $74.8 million in public money 2 , the developers’ request for $39
million in city taxpayer subsidy is “the biggest city funding ever for a Milwaukee
commercial development,” 3 a TID [tax increment district] “twice as large as any previous
City of Milwaukee sponsored TID and greater than the previous seven City TIDs
combined.” 4 The anchor attractions in PabstCity will be a “House of Blues” live-music
venue, Sega’s Gameworks, and a “state-of-the-art 16 screen cinema complex.” 5
Notwithstanding the enormous public expenditure involved, the city’s Department
of City Development (DCD) has aggressively promoted the project –and recommended
approval by the Redevelopment Authority and Common Council—without providing a
rigorous, independent analysis of the economic impact projections and market
assumptions contained in the developers’ proposal. 6 DCD did commission a “TIF
Feasibility Report” from a consultant, S.B. Friedman & Company of Chicago, but the
Friedman report explicitly relies on “market study information…produced on behalf of
1

The Ferchill Group, Redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Historic Pabst Brewery: Tax Increment Financing
Application (January 25, 2005).
2
Tom Daykin, “PabstCity request is too rich, city leaders say,” The Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 28 July
2004.
3
Tom Daykin, “Public tab for PabstCity now $39 million; should city pick it up? The Milwaukee Journal
Sentinel, 29 January 2005. The proposed city subsidy, of course, is just one part of the public financing
proposed by the developers: federal “new market” tax credits, as well as state brownfields grants, would
bring the total public subsidy to around $105 million, or around one-third of the project costs. The city
would also add $2 million for job training, bringing the total city subsidy to $41 million.
4
W. Martin Morics, “Comptroller Report on File 050073 TID 58—PabstCity,” 2 June 2005, p.4.
5
The Ferchill Group, Redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Historic Pabst Brewery, Section A.
6
DCD officials presented the PabstCity TIF plan for approval by the Common Council’s Zoning,
Neighborhoods, and Development Committee on May 17, 2005, without any rigorous, independent market
analysis or cost-benefit analysis. And on May 26, 2005, the city’s Redevelopment Authority (RACM)
actually approved the TID and forwarded it to the Common Council for approval, again without ever seeing
an independent analysis demonstrating the plausibility of the developers’ claims regarding the market for
such a project and its potential economic impact.
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the developer…[and] supplemental retail market information provided by the developer
subsequent to the initial TIF application” – in other words, no independent market
analysis. 7
Such an independent economic impact and market analysis is, of course, crucial for
the Common Council to adequately assess the risks of the proposed PabstCity TID, and
to evaluate whether the promised economic development benefits are likely to materialize
and be worth the public expenditure. Unfortunately, even a cursory review of the
entertainment market in metropolitan Milwaukee and in comparable cities across the
country, suggests that the market assumptions underpinning PabstCity are highly
questionable, the projected economic impact vastly overstated, and the potential damage
to local, non-subsidized entertainment businesses very real.
Indeed, in addition to our own analysis, the City Comptroller’s report and
consultant’s study –finally released on June 2, 2005, only five days before the next
scheduled meeting of the Zoning, Neighborhoods and Development Committee, after the
first presentation of the PabstCity TID to the committee in mid-May, and after the
approval of the plan by RACM on May 26—confirms serious weaknesses in the
economic development analysis underpinning PabstCity. 8 Our recommendation would
be that the Common Council delay action on the PabstCity TID until the Department
of City Development conducts (or the Common Council separately commissions) an
extensive independent analysis of the economic development policy issues surrounding
PabstCity.

KEY ECONOMIC ASSUMPTIONS OF THE PROJECT
The economic development logic, and specific claims, of the PabstCity project can
be summarized succinctly:
•

“When stabilized,” PabstCity will draw over 2.0 million visitors per year; 9

7

S.B. Friedman & Company, TIF Feasibility Report: Proposed Pabst City Redevelopment Project, (May
4, 2005).
8
W. Martin Morics, “Comptroller Report on File 050073 TID 58—PabstCity,” 2 June 2005; C.H. Johnson
Consulting, Final Report: Proposed Economic Development Project: Pabst City (May 2005).
9
The Ferchill Group, Redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Historic Pabst Brewery, Section A.
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•

30% of the clientele of PabstCity attractions will be drawn from outside the
metro Milwaukee area; 10

•

PabstCity will be a “regional attraction designed to capture some of the
$400 million in annual spending that drifts from southeastern Wisconsin to
the Chicago area”; 11

•

“Nearly” 1,000 construction jobs will be created as PabstCity is built; “up to
1,100 new jobs will be created as a result of this urban renewal effort;” 12

•

When “multiplier” effects are calculated –accounting for direct, indirect,
and induced impacts—PabstCity will produce 2,946 jobs during the
construction phase, and 2,650 jobs once the project is operational. 13

It is important for the Council to realize that these are not “hard” numbers, based on
any real trends in tourism and entertainment in Milwaukee; they are projections based –
we assume—on the type of “market study” that developers typically purchase from
consultants to demonstrate the “feasibility” of their project. Indeed, when we look at
actual visitor and expenditure numbers at tourism and entertainment attractions in
Milwaukee and elsewhere, it becomes readily apparent that these numbers, at the very
least, are based on a set of faulty assumptions and fallacious analysis.
Let’s look at each of the key economic assumptions and purported economic impact
of PabstCity:

Two million visitors?

Project promoters claim that PabstCity will attract 2.0 million visitors annually. The
basis of this projection is never provided. Nor do the promoters specify how many of
these visitors will venture to downtown Milwaukee for the explicit purpose of visiting
Pabst City. If the number is less than 2 million –which it most certainly is—then the net
10

Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce, Economic Impact of PabstCity (May, 2005), p. 1.
Daykin, “Public tab for PabstCity now $39 million,” 29 January 2005; Jerry Franke, statement before
City of Milwaukee Common Council, Committee on Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development, 17 May
2005.
12
The Ferchill Group, Redevelopment of Milwaukee’s Historic Pabst Brewery, Section A.
13
MMAC, Economic Impact of Pabst City, p. 1, 3.
11
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economic gain to the city will be commensurately less than projected by PabstCity
promoters. The net economic benefit of the facility for the city as a whole depends on
how many visitors come to the city explicitly for PabstCity. If 2 million visitors are
coming to downtown for other purposes, there is no net benefit for the city whether they
spend money at PabstCity as opposed to other facilities or venues. The employment
impact and spending multipliers will be precisely the same. Thus, the logic of public
subsidy for PabstCity must be the claim that it will bring 2 million visitors to downtown
Milwaukee who would not otherwise be coming to downtown, or at least to the region.
To get a sense of how optimistic this visitor projection is, let’s look at a couple of
other tourism and entertainment settings. 14 In Baltimore, the ten leading attractions in the
city’s Inner Harbor attracted 3.2 million visitors combined last year. 15 This in a city that
has a 25 year history of tourism development, starting with the Rouse company’s
“Harborplace” in 1980, two downtown sports stadiums, a convention center almost twice
the size of Milwaukee’s, 20% more downtown hotel rooms, and the cachet of recently
being named by Frommer’s, a leading travel guide publisher, as “one of the top 10 ‘up
and coming’ summer travel destinations in the world.” 16
Similarly, in Montreal, a city with a long history as an international tourist
destination, not a single individual venue –other than the Casino de Montréal—attracts
more than 500,000 visitors annually. 17
Closer to home, no entertainment or tourist attraction in the city of Milwaukee
draws anywhere near the 2 million visitors projected for PabstCity. The Milwaukee Art
Museum, buoyed by the international recognition garnered by the Calatrava addition, saw
the number of visitors rise to 500,000 in 2003, but in 2004 the number of visitors
declined by 34 percent to just over 300,000. The main reason given for the decline by

14

The C.H. Johnson consulting report for the Comptroller’s office examines “urban entertainment
destinations” in Baltimore, St. Louis, Phoenix, and Indianapolis.
15
Baltimore Area Convention and Visitors Association, Baltimore Tourism Monitor: 4th Quarter and Full
Year 2004 Review (January, 2005).
16
Baltimore Sun, “Baltimore makes list of top 10 travel destinations,” 26 May 2005.
17
Tourisme-Montréal, L’Indicateur plus: Bulletin statistique de l’industrie touristique montréalaise
(décembre 2004). The other “tourist installation” that attracts more than 1 million visitors annually is the
Vieux-Port de Montréal, which is a large, waterfront recreational and tourist district, with bike paths,
canals, hiking, and multiple attractions – very different than PabstCity.
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museum director David Gordon is instructive: he noted that attendance has dropped
“because the novelty of the new building has been on the wane.” 18
Now, here’s a point to ponder as the Common Council contemplates approving a
TID for PabstCity, a TID which, in order to be successful, would require the
entertainment of PabstCity to remain attractive for at least 22 years. If the novelty of the
Calatrava – the veritable icon of the new Milwaukee-- has worn off after only three years,
does anyone really think that 2 million visitors will clamor year-after-year, for 20+ years,
for admission to the movie theatres and game arcades of PabstCity? 19
The example of Baltimore is, once again, instructive here. In 1985, United Artists
opened a nine-screen “Harbor Park” cinema in the heart of the Inner Harbor tourist
district, “hailed as the largest in one building in the Baltimore area and the first new
movie palace to hit any downtown in years.” 20 In 2000, however, UA shut down the
theater, claiming, “the company wasn’t making enough money at the location to remain
open.” 21 At the very least, the Baltimore experience with a downtown cineplex should
make Milwaukee policymakers cautious in approving a TIF plan that would rely on a
downtown cineplex as its anchor. The C.H. Johnson study and Comptroller’s report echo
this concern about the proposed tenant mix in PabstCity.
At the May 17, 2005 meeting of the Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development
committee, DCD Commissioner Marcoux objected to using Baltimore as a “comparable”
to analyze PabstCity or other downtown Milwaukee development, claiming downtown
Baltimore was a much “weaker” market than downtown Milwaukee. The Commissioner
should look a little more closely at urban data. Downtown Baltimore has 29,998

18

Mary Louise Schumacher, “Calatrava fund raising goal met,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 16 May
2005.
19
The C.H. Johnson study of PabstCity, in fact, uses similar language to argue that “the pessimistic
projection” of sales in PabstCity –rather than the optimistic one put forth by developers—is most plausible.
“This [pessimistic] projection matches most closely with the utilization analysis. Therefore, rather than
being pessimistic, this is the most likely scenario in the stabilized year (constant dollars), after the novelty
effect has worn off.” (emphasis in original). C.H. Johnson report, Section 4, page 18.
20
Lorraine Mirabella, “UA theater chain shuts downtown 9-screen cinema,” Baltimore Sun, 8 April 200.
21
Heather Harlan, “BCCC eyes theater property,” Baltimore Business Journal, 8 June 2001. According to
local reports, “United Artists faced other problems…The entranceway to the theater, which also serves as
access for an adjacent parking garage, became a dumping ground for trash as well as a gathering spot for
loiterers and the homeless. And the theater was robbed multiple times.” Ibid.
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residents, compared to 11,364 in downtown Milwaukee. 22 Downtown Baltimore had
3,085 households with annual income above $75,000 in 2000, compared to 1,021 in
downtown Milwaukee. 23 Downtown employment was 25% higher in Baltimore than
Milwaukee in 2002, the most recent data available. 24 Downtown Baltimore, as noted
earlier, has a much more densely developed tourist infrastructure than does downtown
Milwaukee.
In short, the downtown Baltimore market is, by every measure, a more promising
one for entertainment venues than downtown Milwaukee. Yet, the “Power Plant” location
–a “historic site” with eery similarities to PabstCity—endured twenty years of failed
investments in “urban entertainment” before the successful –and highly subsidized-Cordish company development of the late 1990s. 25 And, as we noted above, if the Harbor
Park movie theater didn’t make it financially, Milwaukee officials would do well to
question closely PabstCity promoters and their supporters on what evidentiary basis there
is to believe their plans –in a less prosperous downtown market here—would do better.
None of this “proves,” of course, that the estimate of 2 million visitors to PabstCity
is inflated or that the rosy scenario for a downtown movie theater is erroneous. Perhaps
PabstCity will draw 5,500 new spending customers a day to Milwaukee (without
subtracting from other venues), even after its novelty fades. Perhaps there’s a better
market for downtown movies in Milwaukee, with a smaller, less prosperous downtown,
than in Baltimore. But, the burden of proof is on promoters to defend the plausibility of
their numbers, and there is nothing in the material presented either to RACM or the
Common Council to support these attendance projections. Given the Baltimore
22

U.S. Bureau of the Census, 2000. Census tract data collected at “American Factfinder,”
www.census.gov.
23
Ibid.
24
Calculated from U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, zip code data, www.census.gov.
25
The C.H. Johnson study claims that Power Plant attracts five million visitors annually (section 3, page
12), but it is unclear precisely what constitutes a “visitor’ to the Power Plant: a “browser” at Barnes and
Noble? A stroller through the arcade? Or a consumer at ESPN Zone? If a visitor patronizes all three, does
that count as three visitors to the Power Plant? And, most importantly, to what extent are these visitors
drawn to the Inner Harbor explicitly because of the Power Plant? In fact, the aggregate number of “visitors”
to the Inner Harbor has actually declined in the years since the Power Plant and “Power Plant Live”
opened. See June Arney, “Tourism slump makes presence known at harbor,” The Baltimore Sun, 29
December 2002. Finally, the C.H. Johnson study clearly regards the tenant mix and location of the Power
Plant as superior to PabstCity, suggesting the limited utility in using the Power Plant success as an
argument in favor of a PabstCity TID (section 3 page 14).
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experience –as well as the experience recently in Boston, where opening of Loews’
Boston Common megaplex has resulted in the shutdown of other downtown theaters-there is reason to question the economic logic of a $39 million TIF plan to support, in
part, a downtown movie theater.

30 percent of PabstCity visitors from outside Milwaukee?

The other key claim made by promoters regarding visitors is that 30 percent of
PabstCity’s clientele will come from outside metropolitan Milwaukee. Why is this a
crucial issue? Because it is axiomatic in economic impact analysis that unless an
investment generates what economists call “net exports” –in the case of tourism or
entertainment, this means “outside” dollars coming into the community—then the
investment will not generate any net gain for the community, as consumers simply
substitute spending on one entertainment activity for another. This “substitution effect,”
of course, is what has so many operators of entertainment venues in Milwaukee
concerned about the potential impact of PabstCity on their business. Clearly, both
Commissioner Marcoux and Wispark’s Jerry Franke understand the importance of this
issue: at the May 17 meeting of the Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development
committee, both Marcoux and Franke stressed over and over that PabstCity aims to
“grow the size of the [entertainment] pie” in Milwaukee. 26
There are only two ways to “grow the pie” for a region’s entertainment sector. One
is to raise overall incomes, since households spend a relatively fixed percentage of their
disposable income on entertainment. According to the federal Bureau of Labor Statistics’
Consumer Expenditure Survey, the most reliable source on actual (not projected)
spending by households, the average metro Milwaukee household spends around $530 a
year (or 1.1 percent of pre-tax income) on entertainment “fees and admissions”: this
includes expenses for out-of-town trips, fees for recreational lessons, and the cost of
admission to sporting events, cultural and theatrical events, the movies, and special
26

This repeated Franke’s assertion in January 2005 that “we firmly believe we are growing the size of the
pie,” not simply shifting entertainment expenditures from Brady St. or other entertainment areas, to
PabstCity. See Daykin, “Public tab for PabstCity now $39 million,” Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, 29
January 2005.
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events, such as live musical performances. 27 Thus, in the aggregate, Milwaukee
households spend a little over $395.4 million annually on entertainment fees and
admissions. One way to grow the local entertainment market would be to raise household
income in the region; expenditures on entertainment would commensurately increase. 28
Clearly, there is nothing in the PabstCity plan that would generate this kind of regional
income growth, nor have the promoters claimed that household income –which has been
relatively stagnant in Milwaukee over the past decade—would increase as a consequence
of PabstCity. Indeed, given the preponderance of low-wage jobs envisioned for
PabstCity, it is illogical to assume the project will raise median household income in
Milwaukee, and the profits of local developers and salaries of employees of local
developers –no matter how high they may turn out to be-- will not have a meaningful
effect on median household income or aggregate consumer patterns in the region.
The other way to “grow the [entertainment] pie” would be to bring new consumers
to Milwaukee, and this is the cornerstone claim of PabstCity promoters: that 30% of its
clientele, or approximately 600,000 visitors annually, will come to Milwaukee from
outside the metropolitan area. How plausible is this projection?
First, the developers and promoters present no credible evidence of comparable
facilities, in cities comparable to Milwaukee, drawing that proportion of out-of-town
clientele explicitly for the purpose of visiting the facility. In the C.H. Johnson study
prepared for the Comptroller, the claim is made that between 35-50 percent of the five
million alleged visitors to Power Plant are from outside Baltimore, and 65 percent of
Power Plant Live!’s two million alleged visitors are from outside Baltimore. 29 If this
volume of out-of-town visitors is, in fact, descending on downtown Baltimore, lured by
the Power Plant(s), they curiously appear NOT to be staying in the city’s hotels. Between
1996-2002, according to the Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns, hotel
27

Bureau of Labor Statistics, Consumer Expenditure Survey, 2002-2003; Table 22: Selected Midwestern
metropolitan statistical areas: Average annual expenditures and characteristics; and Table 32: Midwestern
region, by income before taxes: Annual average expenditures and characteristics; www.bls.gov. See also
Neil Tseng, “Expenditures on Entertainment,” www.bls.gov/cex/anthology/csxanth10.pdf.

28

According to the Consumer Expenditure Survey, households earning over $70,000 annually spend
$1,328 annually on “fees and admissions,” compared to $166 annually for households with annual incomes
between $10-20,000.
29
C.H. Johnson, Final Report: Proposed Economic Development Project: PabstCity, (section 3, page 12).
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employment in Baltimore declined by 12.9 percent. 30 The inescapable conclusion is that
the out-of-town visitor figure is vastly inflated.
To our knowledge, no venue in Milwaukee draws anything close to 30 percent of its
visitors from outside the region. The Calatrava, with all its national and international
publicity and iconic status, draws substantially less than 30% of its visitors from outside
Milwaukee. Events such as the Wisconsin State Fair and Summerfest draw close to that
figure, but these are once a year “special events,” with state-wide and civic participation
and sponsorship. 31
Second, the projection of “600,000 outside visitors” rests on some dubious
assumptions about the nature of the tourism and conventions industry in Milwaukee. As
Table 1 shows, the performance of Milwaukee’s convention industry is in something of a
free fall. Incredibly, room night bookings for conventions in Greater Milwaukee have
fallen 31.7 percent since the Midwest Airlines Center opened in 1998. There have been
annual decreases in convention room night bookings in five of the six years since the
Midwest Airlines Center has been in operation. Needless to say, this is far below the
projections offered by consultants in their feasibility study that helped justify a $151
million public “investment” in a new convention center – which ought to give Milwaukee
decision-makers pause every time they are presented with such tainted feasibility or
economic impact studies. Indeed, the most recent room night bookings in local hotels for
conventions are less than one-half the projection offered in an analysis of the convention
center prepared as recently as 2002 for the Greater Milwaukee Convention and Visitor’s
Bureau – another warning sign on the reliability of development-industry consultants. 32
Small wonder that hotel employment in Milwaukee County is down by over nine percent
since 1998 – the year the Midwest Airlines Center opened. 33

30

U.S. Bureau of the Census, County Business Patterns, www.census.gov.

31

UW-Milwaukee Center for Economic Development, The Economic Impact of the 2001 Wisconsin State
Fair (30 July 2002).
32
HVS Convention, Sports, and Entertainment, Market and Feasibility Study: Phase III Expansion,
Midwest Express Center, section 6-22.
33
U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, www.bls.gov.
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Convention Room Nights Booked In Milwaukee, 1997-2003

Year

Convention Room
Nights booked

%
annual
change

1997

187,643

n.a.

1998

167,880

-10.5%

1999

159,491

-5.0%

2000

406,945

155.2%

2001

140,428

-65.5%

2002

139,894

-0.4%

2003

114,540

-18.1%

Source: Metropolitan Milwaukee Association of Commerce

None of this is surprising: a recent study by the Brookings Institution has
documented the over saturation and stagnation in the convention business across the
country; Milwaukee is in “good company” with an underperforming, “white elephant” of
a convention center. 34 But these numbers suggest that there is not a robust or growing
tourism and conventions market in Milwaukee, ready to embrace PabstCity as the next
step in the city’s emergence as a major urban tourism destination. On the contrary, the
tourism and convention market here is in deep difficulty. In short, to the extent that
PabstCity’s promoters are relying on a robust tourism market in Milwaukee, then the
prospects for success at PabstCity are dubious indeed. 35
Finally, there is at least some evidence nationally of a slowdown in job growth in
the entertainment sector, a sign that the current market may not be propitious for a

34

Heywood Sanders, Space Available: The Realities of Convention Centers as Economic Development
Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2005).
35
Moreover, the degree to which conventioneers are likely to spend money on local entertainment venues
is much lower than might be thought – 75% of conventioneer spending is on lodging and meals. See Marc
V. Levine, “Tourism Infrastructure and Urban Redevelopment in Montreal,” in Dennis Judd (ed) The
Infrastructure of Play: Building the Tourist City (Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 257.
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development such as PabstCity, purporting to draw thousands from outside the region. As
Business Week, hardly an anti-developer publication, recently noted:
Which part of the economy is losing jobs the fastest these days? Surprise –
it’s the arts, entertainment, and recreation sector, which is down by 48,000
jobs over the past year. Americans seem to be more interested in listening
to their iPods, browsing the Internet, and enjoying their big-screen TVs
than in playing golf or going to live performances. Even casino
employment is lower than it was a year ago. 36
In other words, given trends in the national market, the timing for PabstCity may
not be propitious. While the arts, entertainment, and recreation sector experienced robust
growth in the 1990s –almost tripling the rate of national employment growth between
1990-2004—PabstCity may be coming along just at the time when this sector has already
lost considerable steam, rendering even more implausible the projection by promoters of
600,000 visitors annually coming to Milwaukee for the explicit purpose of watching a
movie or playing video games at PabstCity. At a minimum, the burden of proof is on the
developers and promoters to demonstrate that PabstCity is not swimming against the tide
of national economic trends, and none of the materials submitted to the Common Council
meet that burden.

Capturing entertainment “leakage” to Chicago?

Another way that PabstCity promoters insist the project will “grow the pie” in
Milwaukee, and not simply take business away from other entertainment venues here, is
by keeping in Milwaukee some of the $400 million that the promoters allege is spent by
Milwaukee area residents on entertainment in Chicago. This is, however, a flawed
argument, on two levels.
First, the promoters provide no evidence for the $400 million figure. Indeed, the
figure strains credulity. As we noted earlier, according to the federal Consumer
Expenditures Survey, metro Milwaukee households spend, in total, around $395.4 million
on entertainment “fees and admissions,” which include expenses for out-of-town trips,
fees for recreational lessons, and the cost of admission to sporting events, cultural and
36

Business Week, “Where the Jobs Aren’t,” 18 April 2005, p. 18.
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theatrical events, the movies, and special events, such as live musical performances.
Thus, the “$400 million in Chicago” figure appears completely fanciful, unless the
promoters are including in it retail purchases made in the Chicago area (e.g. Michigan
Avenue, Gurnee Mills, etc.), not simply entertainment expenditures. But, if so, then
promoters need to demonstrate how attending a movie or playing a video game at
PabstCity will somehow displace outlet mall shopping at Gurnee Mills, or a shopping
spree in downtown Chicago, something they have failed to do.
Second, to the extent there is any logic to this Chicago argument at all, the
promoters seem to assume that entertainment expenditures are fungible rather than
segmented. In other words, if a Milwaukee family intends to visit Chicago to see the
Museum of Science and Industry, the Navy Pier, the Field Museum, the Art Institute, or
some uniquely Chicago attraction, are they likely to turn around and say: “Hey, why
don’t we go to a movie at PabstCity instead?” The likelihood of such fungibility seems
low and, in any event, must be demonstrated by the promoters. In the absence of such
data from the promoters, we can no more assume that PabstCity will capture some of the
Chicago market any more than we can assume that the existence of PabstCity will
dissuade Milwaukeeans from spending their entertainment dollars in Orlando, Las Vegas,
Paris or anywhere outside the region. 37 It is incumbent upon the promoters of PabstCity,
in asking for such substantial public subsidies, to demonstrate that their proposed tenant
mix and attractions will appeal to a significant segment of the market of Milwaukeeans
who spend entertainment dollars in Chicago –whatever the size of that market. None of
the materials presented to the Common Council by the promoters provide this evidence.
In short, the claim that the Milwaukee entertainment market will grow as PabstCity
cuts into the Chicago entertainment expenditures of Milwaukeeans is: a) not
demonstrated at all by the promoters; and b) not plausible, given the actual data we have
on entertainment spending in Milwaukee.

37

There is no way to be certain, but it seems inconceivable that a movie theatre, gameworks, or “House of
Blues” would persuade more than a handful of Milwaukee households annually to forego an entertainmentmotivated trip to Chicago.
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Jobs and spending impact of PabstCity : The MMAC “Economic Impact” Study

At the May 17 meeting of the Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development
committee, members were presented with a four page report from the Metropolitan
Milwaukee Association of Commerce, purporting to show that PabstCity would produce
2,946 construction phase jobs (generating $111.6 million in worker earnings) and 2,650
jobs (generating $54.7 million) in “on-going” benefit through the direct, indirect, and
induced impact of PabstCity businesses. 38 The MMAC “study,” however, commits
several of the most common errors of economic impact studies. The MMAC report:
•

Significantly overstates the degree to which the facility is likely to attract
tourists, thus overstating, in economics jargon, the “net exports” arising
from the facility (and hence its true impact on the Milwaukee economy);

•

Probably overstates the degree to which income generated at PabstCity is
retained in the local economy (this will depend on the tenant mix and
geographical location of ownership);

•

Does not calculate, and thus fails to subtract from the final economic
impact, opportunity costs of the project (defined by economists as “the
sacrifice in other outputs that is necessary to undertake the investment”). 39
In other words, for TID58 as well as the other public subsidies afforded
PabstCity to make sense, the project must generate net benefits that exceed
the alternative uses. PabstCity must be more attractive than an equal
investment in schools, streets, transit, or subsidies for other private
businesses. The “opportunity cost” in subsidizing PabstCity, therefore, is not
simply the cost of the public subsidies, but the benefits from the other ways
this money could be spent.

Fortunately, even though MMAC report ignores the basic economic concept of
“opportunity cost,” the City Comptroller’s letter on PabstCity does not: “Given existing
City financial constraints and other competing needs, this level of expenditure will

38

MMAC, Economic Impact of Pabst City, p. 1-3.
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and Zimbalist (eds), Sports, Jobs, and Taxes (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1997), p. 60.
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necessarily result in the deferral or elimination of other worthwhile City projects or
a sizable increase in City debt. Hence we strongly urge your careful consideration of
the above in your Committee’s deliberations.” 40 We completely concur with the
Comptroller’s recommendation.
We have already documented the degree to which the PabstCity promoters have
overstated the likely “net exports” generated by the project, and, as noted above, the
MMAC impact study repeats this error. Let us review one particularly egregious example
of how this mistake leads to ludicrous estimates of economic impact in the MMAC
report.
Using the promoters’ estimate of 600,000 annual visitations from outside the metro
Milwaukee area as a starting point, MMAC then takes tourist spending estimates from the
Davidson-Peterson analysis provided the Wisconsin Department of Tourism to assert that
58% of these visitors, or 348,000, will stay overnight – in other words, 348,000 genuine
tourists.
There at least two problems here. First, the Davidson-Peterson numbers are highly
suspect. For example, Davidson-Peterson figures show a 16.6 percent increase in real
tourist expenditures in Milwaukee County between 1998-2003 (a 31.6 percent increase in
nominal dollars); yet, hotel employment declined by nine percent in the county during
this period. Where were all these tourists staying? Clearly, the Davidson-Peterson
estimates of tourist expenditures in Milwaukee are seriously inflated.
Second, the application of the Davidson-Peterson formula –not based on a real
counting of real tourists—then leads MMAC to calculate that tourists visiting PabstCity
would spend $30.3 million annually on lodging and generate 511 hotel jobs in
Milwaukee, accounting for fully 27 percent of the predicted total employment impact of
PabstCity. Presuming that the vast majority of these hotel jobs would be in Milwaukee
County (most proximate to PabstCity), this “projection” would imply a 14 percent
increase in the county’s base of hotel jobs, simply as a result of PabstCity. To our
knowledge, no comparable sized entertainment project in any comparable city has had
even remotely that impact; in fact, as we have seen, the financially successful Power
40
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Emphasis in original.
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Plant has not positively influenced hotel employment in Baltimore, and in Milwaukee,
the convention center has completely failed to generate hotel employment. It is not
plausible to believe that enough tourists, traveling to Milwaukee explicitly to visit
PabstCity’s movies, music, or games, would produce this level of impact on the area’s
hotel sector, yet that is what the MMAC impact report claims.
This last point is important, because it is inappropriate for an economic impact study
to attribute a net benefit to a particular facility unless visitors come to a region explicitly
for that facility. 41 If a professor is in Milwaukee for a conference at UWM, and takes in a
movie at PabstCity before returning to the hotel, it is incorrect to attribute the impact on
Milwaukee hotel spending to PabstCity. 42 If clients of a Milwaukee law firm are in town
to discuss pending litigation and decide to relax at Gameworks after their meeting before
returning to their hotel, this too is not an economic impact of PabstCity. Yet, in its wildly
inflated estimate of the impact of PabstCity on hotel employment, the MMAC report
inappropriately attributes all of these net benefits to PabstCity.
In short, the MMAC impact study is fatally flawed and useless as a guide to
policymaking. It contains several methodological flaws. It piles questionable assumption
upon questionable assumption to generate dubious job and spending impact figures that
strain credulity when compared to actual employment and spending numbers in sectors
such as hotels and entertainment in Milwaukee. Our recommendation is that the Council
can safely ignore the MMAC report.

CONCLUSION
This report has examined some of the central claims regarding the potential economic
impact of the PabstCity project and probed the key market assumptions underpinning the
project. We conclude that:

41

This is, as Noll and Zimbalist point out, a common error in impact studies. See Noll and Zimbalist, p. 69.
In the absence of PabstCity, the professor might have gone to the Oriental theater for a movie instead;
thus, the net impact on the Milwaukee economy would be precisely the same (in jobs and spending) –
PabstCity or not—with no net export created by the existence of PabstCity. Only if the professor had come
to Milwaukee explicitly for PabstCity would a net benefit be created for the city’s economy.
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•

Estimates of 2 million annual visitors and 600,000 annual tourists are wildly
exaggerated and unsupported;

•

There is little evidence of a market of tourists who will be drawn to
Milwaukee explicitly for the purpose of visiting PabstCity;

•

Milwaukee’s tourism and conventions market is in deep difficulty, and unlike
other urban entertainment destinations such as Baltimore’s Power Plant,
PabstCity would be developing in a less-than-robust tourist market
environment;

•

There is no evidence of a huge, untapped market of “leaked” Milwaukee-area
entertainment dollars to Chicago that Pabst City is likely to attract;

•

Thus, the likelihood is that a substantial majority of the expenditures at
PabstCity will be “substitution effect’ expenditures, drawing entertainment
dollars away from other local venues. There is little evidence that PabstCity
will “grow the pie;”

•

The job and spending impact estimates provided by MMAC, building on the
original estimates by the project developers, are severely flawed and can be
safely ignored by policymakers.

Our reservations are generally consistent with those expressed in the C.H. Johnson
study prepared for the City Comptroller (although even here, we believe that the Johnson
study is overly optimistic –even in its so-called “pessimistic but likely scenario”—in the
number of tourists it believes will be drawn to PabstCity).
We have not examined a host of other questions that are clearly germane to the
Council’s deliberations on PabstCity. These include:
•

The quality of jobs created at PabstCity and whether rigorous cost-benefit
analysis would justify public subsidies for low-wage, cyclical jobs that do
little to promote overall economic development;

•

The questions surrounding use of such a massive TID, including whether the
project is market-driven or market-distorting, and whether a TID of this nature
will ultimately distort city budgetary and neighborhood development
priorities;
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•

The appropriateness of what some analysts call a “Carnival City” style of
urban economic development. 43 Should cities invest in entertainment
development, or invest in other forms of economic development that are more
promising strategies for raising household income which, in the long run,
would promote entertainment development via market forces? Should cities
like Milwaukee allocate huge public resources for tourism and entertainment
facilities, with any gains from the projects (as in a TIF plan) poured back into
paying off the project instead of enhancing the long-term fiscal needs of other
sectors of the community (schools, parks, streets, etc.)? In the end, does the
“Carnival City” strategy pay off fiscally for cities, and will it pay off for
Milwaukee? That larger public policy debate should frame discussion of the
PabstCity project. 44

We urge the Common Council to fully consider these issues as well, and to solicit
research and analysis on them.
In the last analysis, we believe that serious questions remain about the viability,
impact, and appropriateness of the PabstCity project and much more study and debate is
necessary. PabstCity is a risky project with multiple economic weaknesses and
questionable public benefits. There has been a “rush to development” on the part of
DCD; as stewards of the public interest, the department should be conducting much more
extensive and probing economic analysis of the project.
During the May 17 hearing of the Zoning, Neighborhoods, and Development
committee, Alderman Bauman asked critics of PabstCity a crucial and appropriate
question: If not PabstCity, what alternatives would you propose for the site? That’s the
right question, but Alderman Bauman should have posed it to DCD officials. As this
report has noted, and as the City Comptroller’s letter implied, good economic
43
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On these questions, the C.H. Johnson report prepared for the City Comptroller is less than satisfactory,
as it only examines the conditions for success of urban entertainment destinations comparable to PabstCity
in other cities, not whether, even if financially successful, such investments warrant public subsidy because
they contribute to the overall goals of economic development in cities (i.e. raising resident incomes,
providing revenues to support public services, improving competitiveness and prospects for growth,
attracting talented and productive new residents, etc.).
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development policymaking requires systematic analysis of “opportunity costs;” this
includes alternative redevelopment scenarios or investment strategies for the site, as well
as, in the Comptroller’s words, weighing the value of this project against “deferral or
elimination of other worthwhile City projects.” Clearly, the City has not yet conducted
this kind of rigorous economic analysis; yet such analysis will be crucial for the Common
Council to make a wise decision on PabstCity and other economic development
investments in the years to come.
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